A dual process account of creative thinking

This article explicates the potential role played by type 1 thinking (automatic, fast) and type 2 thinking (effortful, logical) in creative thinking. The relevance of Evans's (2007) models of conflict of dual processes in thinking is discussed with regards to creative thinking. The role played by type 1 thinking and type 2 thinking during the different stages of creativity (problem finding and conceptualization, incubation, illumination, verification and dissemination) is discussed. It is proposed that although both types of thinking are active in creativity, the extent to which they are active and the nature of their contribution to creativity will vary between stages of the creative process. Directions for future research to test this proposal are outlined; differing methodologies and the investigation of different stages of creative thinking are discussed. © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

Inspection Times and the Selection Task: Are They Relevant?

Five experiments are reported based upon Evans'(1996) inspection time paradigm in which subjects are required to solve computer-presented Wason Selection Task problems while simultaneously using a mouse to indicate which card is currently under consideration. It had previously been found that selected cards were inspected for considerably longer than were non-selected cards, and this was taken as support for the existence of pre-conscious heuristics that direct attention towards relevant aspects of a problem. The first experiment reported here fully replicated this effect. However, by systematically varying the task format in subsequent experiments, the effect was found to diminish, disappear, or even reverse. The change in effect size and direction was not accompanied by any systematic variations in the subjects’ card choices, indicating that the changes in taskformat had not altered the operation of the relevance-determining heuristics. On balance, it is suggested that the inspection time effect appears to be artefactual, and the inspection time paradigm therefore does not constitute satisfactory evidence for the existence of pre-conscious heuristics. </jats:p

When the Solution Is on the Doorstep: Better Solving Performance, but Diminished Aha! Experience for Chess Experts on the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem

Insight problems are difficult because the initially activated knowledge hinders successful solving. The crucial information needed for a solution is often so far removed that gaining access to it through restructuring leads to the subjective experience of “Aha!”. Although this assumption is shared by most insight theories, there is little empirical evidence for the connection between the necessity of restructuring an incorrect problem representation and the Aha! experience. Here, we demonstrate a rare case where previous knowledge facilitates the solving of insight problems but reduces the accompanying Aha! experience. Chess players were more successful than non‐chess players at solving the mutilated checkerboard insight problem, which requires retrieval of chess‐related information about the color of the squares. Their success came at a price, since they reported a diminished Aha! experience compared to controls. Chess players’ problem‐solving ability was confined to that particular problem, since they struggled to a similar degree to non‐chess players to solve another insight problem (the eight‐coin problem), which does not require chess‐related information for a solution. Here, chess players and non‐chess players experienced the same degree of insight